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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents find no substantial fault with appellant's
Statement of Facts, but it is felt there should be some
clarification, and some emphasis on further facts in this
case.
Respondents, the Blackers from Utah and the Blackers
from Idaho, two separate and distinct entities, had been
in the furniture and appliance business for many years.
We shall hereafter refer to both entities as "The Blackers".
Third party defendants, John Gray and Edward Graven,
hereafter referred to as "Gray" and "Graven", were dismissed from the lawsuit herein on October 29, 1984, by
reason of the bankruptcies filed by them (R-122-123).
Plaintiff-Appellant, Copper State Leasing Company,
hereafter referred to as "Copper State", had been contacted
by Gray and Graven on several occasions and had explained
to them in detail the program referred to as an arbitrage
system (the buying and selling very quickly of commodities,
and profiting through the fluctuation in prices and
through the use of computers).

The purpose of the meetings

with Copper State by Gray and Graven was not only to have
them understand every step of the arbitrage program, but
to have them become the leasing entity of computers with
their numerous investors who would be leasing the computers
CTT-7-9, 41-42, Gray Depo. 4-5).
Although other leasing companies were checked on by
Gray and Graven, they seemed to settle upon and deal with
Copper State as they had done business numerous times with
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Copper State and they had a verbal agreement with them, that
if people qualified, the lease would be consummated
(TT-10-11).
Gray and Graven anticipated making profits from the
sale of computers to Copper State, who would own title to
the equipment and in turn lease it to the investors found
by Gray and Graven (TT-15).
Gray and Graven operated through the use of certain
organi2:ations, to-wit:

"Funds Management Systems",

"Unified Mortgage", and "Cowboy Computer", but according
to two employees of Gray and Graven, those organizations
were one and the same as Gray and Graven and were being
used and manipulated to suit their own specific purposes,
(See Janice Cash and D.R. Anderson Affidavits R-30-35)
The Blackers were contacted by Gray and Graven in the
spring of 1981 about the arbitrage program, after the
contact and explanation of the system had been made to
Copper State (TT-7-8).

The Blackers were told that a

master computer had been lined up (Gary Blacker Depo. 21),
but that each of the investors (about 35 being involved)
would need their own computers to be in the program and
that Copper State was involved in the program.

(James

Blacker Depo. 7, 11, 12, 13, 17, 19, James Blacker
Affidavit R-36-38). (See also TT 124-125 for Copper
State's involvement).
The Blackers were further informed by Gray and
Graven that the Blackers would be required to sign as
lessees of the two computers (one for each Blacker entity),
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but that in fact Gray and Graven would be making the lease
payments as a part of the arbitrage program and that
Copper State understood this arrangement (Cash and Blacker
Affidavits R-30-32, R-36-38, Gary Blacker Depo. 23-24,
James Blacker Depo, 19-20, 36-38).
It was not until approximately 6 months after the
leases were executed by Slackers that Copper State informed
Blackers that Gray and Graven were not paying the lease
payments, although Gray had sent in one or two checks as
payments that had not cleared.

(Gary Blacker Depo. 48-49,

James Blacker Depo. 42)
There was virtually no contact between Copper State
and Blackers.

All matters were conducted through Gray

and Graven, including lease arrangements, getting the
Blacker stores cleared and accepted by Copper State
after first being rejected, obtaining signatures, the
information to be put on the leases, obtaining the money
for the purchase of the computers, what was placed on the
invoices describing the computers to come from Data General,
the 90-day delay period on delivery, etc. (Cash, Anderson,
and Blacker Affidavits, R-30-38, James Blacker Depo. 9,
19T20, 37-38, 51-52, TT-63, 108-109, Gary Blacker Depo.
24, 27-28).
Copper State, however, did have one of their
representatives present, along with Gray and Graven, when
the pictures were shown of a type computer from Data
General and the 90-day delay time from Data General was
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talked about. (Gary Blacker Depo. 30-31, 36-37, James Blacker
Depo. 27, TT-63).
Copper State, furthermore was aware that the money they
paid over to Gray and Graven, made out to Cowboy Computer,
was for the purpose of Gray and Graven to obtain the
computers from Data General, and that Cowboy Computer
was not the actual supplier, even thoucrh the name of the
supplier of the computers was left off the leases. (TT137-138, Cash and Anderson Affidavits R-30-35).
At the time Copper State turned over the $84,000.00
to Gray and Graven, Blackers were unaware that Gray and
Graven diverted the money into a diamond scheme with
Mr. Vasilocopolous to try and make a fast return, or that
Gray and Graven had not perfected the order from
Data General on the computers, and these facts were not
discovered by Blackers until several months later, in
fact after Mr. Vasilocopolous had been arrested. (James
Blacker Depo. 46, TT-40, 42, 52, TT-119).
Gray stated that he couldnft remember if he told
Copper State of the interim investment in diamonds, of
their funds, but that Copper State knew that the computer
equipment was not there (with Gray and Graven and
Cowboy Computer), and that it would be sometime before
the computer equipment would be there (TT-30, 32, TT-120).
Blackers invested $300,000.00 from both stores in the
arbitrage program with Gray and Graven, and because of the
delays involved with arbitrage, they authorized their
$30.0,000 to go into the interim diamond investment which
+4-

was lost.

However, the Blackers at no time authorized,

or knew of, the Copper State money to go into the said
interim investment, but Blackers understood that between
Copper State and Gray and Graven computers would in fact
be provided to them.

(Gary Blacker Depo. 40-46, 58-59,

James Blacker Depo. 26-27, 42-43, TT-40, 42-43, 52-53

91,

93-94, TT 119-121).
Further, at the time Blackers discovered that
Gray and Graven had used Copper State's money in the
diamond investment, Blackers asked whether Copper State
was aware of this fact, and Gray and Graven responded
that they were.

Thus, Blackers did not say anything to

Copper State about it.

(TT 119-120)

The Copper State leases were signed by the Blackers
but no computers were ever ultimately ordered, delivered,
or received by Blackers and no effort was made by Copper
State to see that the computers were obtained or delivered.
(James Blacker Depo. 21, James Blacker Affidavit R-36-38,
Steven Beckstead Depo. 11)
Furthermore, Blackers were led to believe by Copper
State and Gray and Graven at the time Graven instructed
Blackers to type the words in their leases, "Disburse
money to Cowboy Computer prior to delivery of computer.
We understand that this will initiate the lease . . .",
that the ordering of the computers had in fact been
perfected through Data General, that the money was needed
to pay the supplier, Data General, so that Copper State
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could get title to the equipment and that delivery of the
same was in process but would take three months or so.
(James Blocker Depo. 26-27f 30-32, Gary Blacker Depo.
36-37, 63, 69-70, TT-48-49, 93, 102, 114, 135-137).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

There were no material factual issues involved

or in dispute at the hearing of September 4, 1984, when
both appellant and respondents1 attorneys argued their
cross motions for Summary Judgment-

There was nothing

apparent to the lower court as to any disputed material
issues. Both attorneys represented to the court that there
were no factual disputes, and no objections or opposition
was raised by any party to the facts that had been carefully submitted and argued before the court.

Nothing

could be further developed from a factual standpoint by
another trial, as wide latitude was given in interrogating
all the essential witnesses in the Second Cause of Action,
and the lower court was justified in granting Summary
Judgment in Respondents1 favor.
Furthermore, the lower court was correct in holding,
as a matter of law, that Copper State was not entitled to
recover from Blackers lease payments for computers under
the Lease agreements signed by Blackers as Blackers never
received the computer equipment and Copper State never
obtained title, by reason of the wrongful diversion of
Copper State's funds by intermediaries, Gray and Graven.
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2.

Copper State worked closely with Gray and Graven

with the anticipation of becoming the leasing entity for
numerous investors found by Gray and Graven.

Gray and

Graven anticipated on making profits through the sale of
computers to Copper State.

Thus an agency developed between

them in the acquisition of computers.

Gray and Graven

misused Copper State's money that should have crone to buy
the computer equipment.

Blackers had no knowledge of

Gray and Gravensf actions and did not and could not clothe
them with any apparent authority to do anything wrongful
or unauthorized.
3.

Blackers did not discover the wrongful diversion

of Copper State's money by Gray and Graven in the
Vasilocopolous Diamond Scheme until several months after
the occurrance and that was also after the publicity and
arrest of Vasilocopolous had taken place.

There could be

no ratification of Gray and Gravens1 unauthorized actions
by Blackers under these circumstances.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN RESPONDENTS" FAVOR ON COPPER
STATE'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.

A.

Counsel for appellant argues that the lower court

was in error in granting a Partial Summary Judgment in favor
of Blackers by reason of numerous genuine issues of material
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fact being involved or in dispute at the hearing.

We do not

agree.
There were no material factual issues involved or
disputed at the hearing on September 4, 1984 when both
Copper State's and Blackers' (plaintiff and defendants)
Motions for Summary Judgment were argued before the Court.
In fact both parties' attorneys, in filing their seperate
Motions for Summary Judgment, as well as in the actual
argument before the Court, represented that there were no
factual disputes and no genuine issues of material facts
to be determined by the Court.
It should be noted that Copper State's attorney from
the commencement of the case and through all of the
Summary Judgment motions and hearings was Richard Crandall
of Snow, Christensen and Martineau.

After the lower court's

decision in Slackers' favor on the Summary Judgment motions,
Attorney Richard Crandall withdrew from the case and
Attorney Jeffrey M. Jones of Allen, Nelson, Hardy and
Evans entered his appearance to handle the trial in the
Second Cause of Action and this appeal.
0>n February 18, 1983, Attorney Crandall filed
motions for Summary Judgment (R-22-25) on behalf of Copper
State.

This was opposed by Blackers, (R-40-43) and after

a hearing on the matter the court denied Copper State's
Motions (R-51).

Thereafter, Copper State amended their

Complaint, alleging two causes of action against Blackers.
After some further discovery procedures it was agreed
between counsel for the parties and the Court that in order
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to save possible trial time, Copper State would submit to
Blackers, through counsel, their issues of facts,
memorandum and authorities on the law, and then Blackers
would respond in like manner.
On March 26, 1984, Attorney Crandall hand delivered
Copper State's Facts and Memorandum to counsel for
Blackers, along with his Motion for entry of Judgment in
Copper State's favor, "on the grounds and for the reason
that there is no issue of material fact, the existence of
which would constitute a defense to the plaintiff's claims.If
On March 30, 1984, counsel for Blackers objected to
Copper State's Motion, at that time, on the basis that it
was premature, and that in accordance with the understanding of counsel and the court, Blackers needed some
time to respond to Copper State's memorandum with their
own memorandum (R-82-84).
Thereafter, on July 5, 1984, counsel for Blackers
filed his "Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion
for Entry of Judgment and Memorandum in Support of
Blackers Motion for Summary Judgment." (R 96)
In Blackers Motion for Summary Judgment (R-94), counsel
set forth, just as Copper State's attorney had done,
"that there are no genuine issues as to any material
facts . . . "
Argument on the two notions was set for September 4,
1984.

The court gave the parties considerable time for

the argument, and the same was transcribed by the Court
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Reporter (see Transcript of Proceedings of September 4,
1984 1-32).

In that argument counsel for both parties

spent considerable time setting forth the material facts
in the case and there was no dispute on those facts for
either side, and the Court made the comment:
'"Countermotion for Summary Judgment, I take an
admission by both sides if there are no material
issues of fact, so whatever I do will be dispositive of this case, I suppose, Richard,
anything further?"
No further comment was made by the attorneys,
and so the Court, after taking the matter under advisement and study, later made its decision in Blackers
favor.

However, upon motion for clarification it was

determined that Copper State's Second Cause of Action
was not disposed of by the Court's ruling

and thus a

trial was had on those issues.
Counsel for Blackers had set forth a statement of
facts in his memorandum supporting Summary Judgment in
Blackers favor (R-96-102), and in that statement there
was noted in great detail for each set of facts the
references to the depositions, affidavits, and
documents involved in the case.

At no time did counsel

for Copper State raise any question/ opposition or dispute
as to those facts, even though there was an entire month
that passed between the filing of the memorandum and
the argument on the motions.

Indeed, there was in fact

no dispute as to any of the material facts.
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Counsel for appellant cites several Utah cases in his
argument on the "Standard for Summary Judgment on Review",
but we see no conflict with those cases on what the lower
court ruled in our case.

Furthermore, none of those cases

cited involved cross or mutual motions for Summary Judgment.
The case Mastic Tile Division of Ruberoid Co. v.
Acme Distributing Co., 389 P 2d

56 (Utah 1964) is a case

where both sides presented mutual motions for Summary
Judgment, and the Court held that the losing party was
not entitled to a trial on the facts after the Court made
its decision.

The holding is as follows:

"Where both sides laid controversy in lap of
court by Summary Judgment motions and interpretation of writing was only issue, court
could not be required to submit to subsequent
urging of loser that although he took his
chances without reservation, he should have
another go at case at trial."
In the case at bar, the only issue in the First Cause
of Action was the interpretation of the lease documents signed
by the Blackers involving two computers that were never
received, and the controversy was laid in the lap of the
lower court.

Copper State should not now be allowed to

change legal counsel and have another go at the case at
another trial, and especially since Copper State was allowed
great latitude by the lower court in developing its case
on the Second Cause of Action, touching upon the entire
case and interrogating essentially all of the witnesses
who were involved in the controversy.

In other words,

nothing could be further developed or gained, from a
factual standpoint, from another trial of this case
that is not already in the record.
-11-

The case of Dupler v. Yates, 351 P2d 624 (Utah 1960)
also holds for the proposition that:
"Where defendants produced evidence that pierced
the allegations of the Complaint and the plaintiff
did not controvert, explain, or destroy that
evidence by counter affidavit or otherwise, the
court would be justified in concluding that no
genuine issue of fact was present and that Summary
Judgment should be rendered for the moving party."
See also along these lines the case of Continental
Bank and Trust Company v. Cunningham, 353 P 2nd 16 8 (Utah
1960) .
Furthermore, Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure implies that a party opposing Summary Judgment
needs to show forth some defense of his position or he can't
complain.

In the last half of the rule it states:

" . . . when a motion for Summary Judgment is made
and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleadings, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, Summary Judgment, if appropriate, shall
be entered against him."
In Burningham v. Ott 525 P 2nd 620 (Utah 1974) the
court held:
"Plaintiff says the case should be decided under the
rules that (1) the evidence should be viewed in a
light favorable to the plaintiff, and (2) a Summary
Judgment is a harsh rule. He is not correct in
either claim. In Summary Judgments, evidence is not
to be viewed. The judgment can be given only in case
there is no dispute on a material evidentiary matter.
We do not see that it is a harsh rule to tell a
party that he is not entitled to recover as a matter
of law when the facts are not in dispute."
Again in Webster v. Sill 675 P 2nd 1170 (Utah 1983)
this court said:
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"To raise a genuine issue of fact to preclude Summary
Judgment, an affidavit must do more than reflect
affiants opinions and conclusions, affiant must set
forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue
for trial."
In the annotation on cross motions for Summary Judgment
36 ALR 2nd 835, under the issue of "effect of motions as
admissions", it states:
"on cross motions for Summary Judgment, each party
admits for the purpose of his motion that there is
no issue of material fact and that the facts alleged
by the adverse party, properly pleaded, are true."
When the present case was argued before the lower court
on cross motions for Summary Judgment there were simply no
material factual issues in dispute, and although present
counsel for Copper State now says there were some disputes,
the Judge was not obligated to go through all the material
to see if he could find, by microscopic inspection, something that possibly could be questioned when the attorneys
for both parties agreed that there were no disputed
material factual issues.
Counsel for Copper State sets forth about 8 situations
comparing facts of Copper State and the Slackers to try and
show material disputes between the parties.

A close

examination of these situations, however, discloses that
there was in fact no real dispute, or if there was some
question or difference, it was not really material and would
not have a serious bearing on the questions of law before
the court.

Counsel also wrongfully cites the statements

of witnesses from the trial transcript (TT) to show some
differences, which facts were not developed until the trial
of the Second Cause of Action, May 15, 1985, almost a year
-11-

after the cross motions for Summary Judgment were presented.
In any event, most all, if not all, the so called questions
raised by counsel in his 8 situations were clarified in the
trial that took place on May 15, 1985, and nothing could be
further developed that's not already of record in this case
from a factual standpoint, that could bear on the law
issues.
B.

Counsel for appellant further argues that the

lower court was in error in granting partial Summary Judgment
in favor of Blackers as a matter of law.

Again we do not

agree.
We have outlined the detailed facts in the "Statement
of Facts" in this brief along with the details and references to the record, but for purposes of this argument on
the law certain pertinent facts are reviewed.
1.

Copper State Leasing Company was to purchase

certain described computer equipment and hold title to the
same.
2.

Copper State agreed to lease that computer

equipment to the two Blacker entities for certain rental
fees.
3.

John Gray and Edward Graven acted as inter-

mediaries between lessor and lessees, there being little or
no contact between Copper State and Blackers.
4.

Gray and Graven had represented to Blackers that

they would be making the lease payments on the computers
and they in fact made attempts at one or two payments with
plaintiff.
-14-

5.

Gray and Graven had considerable contact with

Copper State and it was known that many investors could be
involved with leasing computers through plaintiff company.
6.

Blackers were turned down oriqinally on their

lease applications by Copper State, but were later approved
through no effort of their own, but through the efforts or
intervention of Gray and Graven.
7.

Copper State had Gray and Graven instruct

Blackers exactly what to type on the lease agreements just
prior to disbursing approximately 584,000.00 ($42,000.00
for each lease) to Gray and Graven (Cowboy Computer).
8.

No purchase of computer equipment from the real

supplier, Data General, was in fact made.
9.

No computer equipment was ever received by nor

delivered to either of the Blacker entities.
10.

Blackers did not know that Gray and Graven had

diverted the funds received from Copper State to other
uses.
11.

Blackers were not notified by Copper State

until approximately six months after the signing of the
leases, that Gray and Graven were not making lease
payments.
Under the facts and circumstances of this case,
Respondents, Blackers, should not be required by law to
pay rental and lease payments on computer equipment they
have never received or had the use of.
Under paragraph 5 of the lease agreement (Addendum
2 and 5 - Appellant's Brief) it states:
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"Ordering Equipment, Lessee hereby requests Lessor
to purchase the equipment from the above-named
supplier . . . "
No supplier was listed anywhere on the lease agreements, but Copper State, and Gray and Graven had mentioned
to Blackers, and shown them pictures, of the computers to
come from Data General.
Now, Blackers had a right to rely

on the fact that

if they were ultimately to have a responsibility in the
payment of the lease, then lessor had the responsibility to
see that it was in fact acquired (title obtained) and
properly ordered.

That responsibility was not altered by

having lessees agree to a disbursement of funds prior to
delivery.

(It was understood there would be about a

three month waiting period for delivery).
We need to look to the intention of all the parties
as we view this transaction and what transpired.
In the first place, there appeared to be a close
working relationship between Gray and Graven and Copper
State by reason of the Arbitrage Program that had been
explained to them step by step, and that Copper State
contemplated becoming the leasing entity of computers
with the numerous investors of Gray and Graven, and at
least one (the Anderson) lease and computer had already
taken place with Copper State through Gray and Graven.
That computer had been shown to the Blackers.
Blacker Depo. p. 36-38).

(See Gary

The 90 day delay in delivery

time had also been discussed.

Furthermore, it was clearly
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understood between Blackers and Gray and Graven that Gray
and Graven would see to the lease payments for the
computers. (See Gray Depo. P. 9-10).
Now, with this background, when Blackers were instructed by Gray and Graven to type on the leases, "Please disburse money to Cowboy Computers prior to delivery.

We

understand that this will initiate the lease and payments
will start one month from date of funding," it was the
intention of the parties that the computer equipment would
be ordered by lessor and that they were putting out the
money up front for that purpose.

That there would be a

delay in actual delivery to the Blackers, but in the meantime any payments to Copper State Leasing would be coming
from Gray and Graven.
Therefore, when in fact NO computer equipment was
ever shipped out and none ever received by Blackers, the
lease agreements became null and void and Blackers could
rescind.

There was no consideration, no bargain fulfilled,

and the lease agreements cannot be enforced against
Blackers.
The lease agreements themselves, Paragraph 8, also
support this view (R-6), it states:
"Upon the execution of this lease and the delivery of
an item of equipment, lessee shall be obligated to
perform in accordance with the terms hereof."
Because no item of equipment was ever received,
lessees should not be required to pay the rental.
This argument of Blackers/ contrary to the argument
of appellant, is also supported in the recent Utah Supreme
Court cases of "FIIA Financial Corporation v. Hansen Dairy, Inc.,

Utah, 617 P 2nd 327 (1980) and Nielsen and Walton v. MFT
Leasing, Utah 656 P 2nd 454 (1982).

Both of these cases

are almost exactly the situation we have here with Copper
State Leasing and the Blackers.
In the FMA v. Hansen Dairy case, FMA brought action
for damages on breach of a written lease agreement in the
lease of a used corn silo.

The defendants asserted the

defense of failure of consideration in that the silo was
not delivered and installed as agreed.

The defendants had

signed an acceptance notice which provided:
"the items received by us were and are in good order
and condition and acceptable to us as delivered or
installed."
With that acceptance notice signed, FMA then paid out
$36,000.00.

FMA argued that defendants should be estopped

to claim failure of consideration because of the signed
acceptance.

The court, however did not agree and held in

favor of defendants.
Just as in the FMA case, there was failure of consideration in the Blackers never having received the computer
equipment, even though they had signed (so to speak) the
"acceptance notice" involving delivery and the payout of the
money - exactly as in the FMA case.
Similarly, and even more like our present case, is the
"Nielsen and Walton v. MFT Leasing" case above cited.

In

that case Nielsen and Walton sued MFT Leasing to rescind a
lease of computer equipment for failure of consideration.
MFT counter-claimed against Nielsen and Walton seeking a
money judgment for the lease payments, (just as in our case).
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The trial court granted a decree of rescission of the lease
based on MFT's failure to provide the computer equipment
called for in the lease, (just as in our case).

The Utah

Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.
The facts in the MFT case showed that there was an
acknowledgment of delivery which stated:
"that the lease equipment had been delivered to
Nielsen and Walton and that Nielsen and Walton had
examined the equipment invoice and requested MFT
to pay the amount of the invoice to the supplier."
The computer equipment, however, called for in the
lease was not the same as the computer equipment delivered.
(Our case is stronger in that no computer equipment was
ever received by Blackers).
The Supreme Court stated:
"having proved that the equipment delivered was not
the equipment specified in the lease, Nielsen's and
Walton's acknowledgment of delivery does not
necessarily defeat their claim of lack of consideration, at least where MFT knew, or had an ample
opportunity to determine, that the goods which were
the subject matter of the lease had not been
delivered. Under such circumstances, a written
recital that consideration has ever been received
may be contradicted." (The court cited the FMA v.
Hansen Dairy case in further support of this holding).
MFT argued that the trial court based its decision
for rescinding the lease agreement on other grounds
involving the supplier of the equipment, but the Supreme
Court reiterated that;
"The findings of fact and conclusions of law clearly
show that the trial court based its decision on the
fact that MFT did not provide the equipment specified
in the lease contract." - - - "that these findings
clearly support the trial court's conclusion of law
that the plaintiffs were entitled to rescind the lease
for failure of consideration."
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Now counsel for appellant attempts to show that a
new bargain was reached when the words, "Please disburse
money to Cowboy Computers prior to delivery", were written
on the leases and further that this is different, or
distinguishes this case, from the "FMA" and "MFT" cases.
This is not so.
In the first place Copper State knew that Cowboy
Computer (Gray and Graven) was not the supplier, but that
Data General was the supplier (TT 137-138, Cash and
Anderson Affidavits R-30-35, Gary Blacker Depo. 30-31,
36-37, James Blacker Depo. 27, TT 63), and even though
Blackers acknowledged that the money could be paid over,
they still expected Copper State to receive title to the
equipment.

This was not done and no new bargain was reached.

Exactly the same situation arose in the "MFT" and
"FMA" cases.

Nielsen and Walton, in the "MFT" case, had

acknowledged delivery and requested MFT to pay the amount of
the invoice.

Isn't that exactly what was done here?

r

Please

disburse and we will take responsibility of delivery."

We

fail to see the distinction that appellant is trying to make
in these two Utah cases, and we submit that these two
cases do apply and are right in point in our situation.

POINT II
THE BLACKERS DID NOT CLOTHE GRAY AND GRAVEN WITH
APPARENT AUTHORITY TO RENDER THE BLACKERS LIABLE
FOR COPPER STATE'S LOSS OF LEASE PROCEEDS.
This issue of "apparent authority" was not raised
by appellant, Copper State, in its complaint either in the
-90-

First Cause of Action or the Second Cause of Action, and
it should not now be argued by them on appeal.
The lower court, however, did make a finding on
June 4, 1985, after the trial on the Second Cause of Action,
as follows;
"4. That John Gray and/or Edward Graven and/or
any of their entities were not the agents of
defendants in connection with the use of the funds
that were paid over to the said John Gray and Edward
Graven from plaintiff that went into the investment
scheme of the said John Gray, Edward Graven or their
entities." (Addendum No. 10 - Appellant's Brief)
There were ample facts, however, to show that Gray
and Graven were agents on behalf of Copper State in
connection with the acquisition of the computer equipment.
Copper State had been contacted several times by
Gray and Graven and had explained to them every step of the
Arbitrage Program and in addition Copper State anticipated
becoming the leasing entity of computers with Gray and
Graven1s numerous investors (about 35 were mentioned).
(TT-7-9, 41-42, Gray Depo. 4-5),
Gray and Graven anticipated making profits from the
sale of computers to Copper State, who would own title to
the equipment and in turn lease to the investors found by
Gray and Graven. (TT-15)
Gray and Graven also had done business numerous
times with Copper State and a verbal commitment was
reached with them that if people qualified the lease
would be consummated (TT-10-11).
There was also very little contact between Copper
State and Slackers.

Essentially all matters were conducted

through Gray and Graven, including lease arrangements,

getting the Blackers cleared and accepted by Copper State
even though being first rejected, obtaining signatures,
outlining exactly what statements were to be written on the
leases, obtaining the money for the purchase of the
computers, the information that went on the invoices
describing the computers to come from Data General, the
information on the 90 day delay period on delivery, etc.
(Cash, Anderson and Blacker Affidavits, R-30-38, James
Blacker Depo. 9, 19-20, 37-38, 51-52, TT 63, 108-109, Gary
Blacker Depo. 24, 27-28).
It is apparent that all of these acts of Gray and
Graven were for the benefit and profit of Copper State
and Gray and Graven in these lease transactions and
constituted an agency between them.
Thus, the knowledge of Gray and Graven concerning
the supplier and the ordering, (or failure to order)

the

computer equipment is imputed to Copper State leasing as
the lessor.

This is true, whether or not the lease agree-

ment states otherwise as to agency.
Again the case in point on this issue is the Utah
case (1980) of FMA Financial Corporation v. Hansen Dairy,
Inc., previously cited herein.

The court held:

"that an agent's knowledge with respect to the
lease agreement was imputed to the lessor where
the lessor entrusted the handling of its interests
in the lease transaction to the agent."
It was also noted in the FMA case, that all dealings
were done through the levies, the sellers of the equipment
to the leasing company (comparable to Gray and Graven in
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our case), and that levies received the $36,000,00 check
for the equipment.

The court held that because FMA (lessor)

entrusted levies to the handling of the transaction that
levies knowledge was imputed to FMA, and this was true even
though the lease agreement may state otherwise.

The court

ignored the language in the lease as to agency, stating:
"We so state in awareness of the language in the lease
which provided: fLessee understands and agrees that
neither supplier nor any salesman or other agent or
supplier, is an agent of lessor - - - and no representation as to equipment or any other matter by supplier
shall in any way affect lessees duty to pay the rent1
_ _ _

n

.

The situation in the FMA case is very similar to our
case on this agency question, and it is Slackers' contention that any knowledge of Gray and Graven in the
obtaining of the computer equipment, or the failure to
obtain the same, should be imputed to Copper State Leasing,
and even though Copper State paid out their money to Gray
and Graven (Cowboy Computer), and Blackers had signed the
leases, nevertheless, Copper State should be denied their
claim of rental or other damages on the lease agreements
because of their failure to provide the computer equipment
to Blackers.
POINT III
THE BLACKERS DID NOT RATIFY THE ACTIONS OF GRAY
AND GRAVEN SUFFICIENT TO MAKE THEM LIABLE FOR
COPPER STATEfS LOSS.
The trial court found (in the Second Cause of Action)
that Blackers had no knowledge at all of Gray and Graven's
-23-

diverting Copper State's money into the diamond investment
scheme (Addendum No. 10 - Appellant's Brief).

Furthermore,

again, because of the close working relationship between
Copper State and Gray and Graven, which had extended over
the years, Copper State was no doubt in a better position
to know the thinking of Gray and Graven than were the
Blackers, and perhaps Copper State should have known that
when they gave the lease proceeds to Gray and Graven that
the money might be used for an unauthorized purpose.

It

is just as ludicrous to believe that Blackers knew or
should have known that Gray and Graven would misuse the
funds that were to purchase the computers as to believe
that Copper State knew or should have known that would
transpire.
Blackers did make a $300,000.00 investment of their
own funds with Gray and Graven, which amount was lost to
them, but Blackers did not become aware of either the
scheme involved with Vasilocopolous or that Copper State's
money had gone there until several months later and after
Mr. Vasilocopolous had been arrested (James Blacker Depo.
46, TT-40, 42, 52, TT-119).
Also, at the time Blackers discovered that Gray and
Graven had used Copper State's money in the diamond investment, after the publicity and the arrest, it was too late
to do anything about it.

Nevertheless, Blackers did inquire

of Gray and Graven at that time whether or not Copper State
was aware of the use that had been made of their money and
they responded in the affirmative.

Thus, Blackers did not

say anything to Copper State about it (TT-119-120).

The cases cited by appellant on ratification require
the principal to have knowledge of all material facts and
an intent to ratify,

Blackers had no knowledge of the facts

and thus could not be in a position to ratify the unauthorized use of Copper Statefs funds.

Blackers had fully

expected the Copper State money to be turned over to Data
General - the supplier - for the purchase of the computers,
and it would be ridiculous to believe that Blackers ratified
any other use of those funds•
Appellant further argues that the failure to disaffirm may constitute ratification, but this, too, is
preposterous in this case as Blackers did not become aware
of the diversion of Copper State's money until it was too
late to do anything about it, and Blackers had every right
to believe that Copper State had become aware of the matter
or that Gray and Graven had in fact disclosed this to them.
Copper State's attempt to shift their loss to
Blackers by reason of ratification of the wrongful conduct
of Gray and Graven should be struck down.
CONCLUSION
The lower court properly granted Summary Judgment
in respondent's favor on the First Cause of Action, and
said court was also correct in entering Judgment in favor
of respondents and against appellant of no cause of
action on the Second Cause of Action.

This court should

therefore affirm the judgments and decisions of the lower
court in this case.
DATED this

Ifr* day of January, 1986.

Respectfully submitted,
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